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JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS 






After the so-called ‘discovery’ of the Americas by Christopher Columbus 
in 1492, the dominant powers of Europe participated in a competitive rush 
for colonies that eventually encompassed most of the world. The initial 
preeminence of Spain and Portugal in this colonial enterprise was later 
overtaken by the ascent of France and Great Britain, with Britain emerging 
as the dominant empire-builder at the end of the Seven-Years War in 
1763. After World War II, this process was reversed by the decolonization 
of much of Asia and Africa, where former colonies became independent 
and joined the international community as nation-states. In other parts of 
the world, colonies generally known as ‘settler colonies’ also achieved 
independence. In these former colonies, European settlers had arrived and 
reproduced in such numbers that they became the majority of the 
population. Achievement of nation-state status by these colonies did not 
result in restoration of the independence of the Indigenous peoples who 
lived there when the Europeans arrived. Instead, the European settlers 
remained in control after asserting independence from their mother 
country. In some cases, this was the result of unilateral assertion, as 
occurred when the Thirteen Colonies in British North America rebelled in 
the 1770s and created the United States of America. In other instances, 
there was a gradual evolution from colonial status to independent nation-
state: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are the leading examples from 
the British Empire.1 
                                                 
 
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada. 
1  See generally WR Louis (ed), The Oxford History of the British Empire, 5 vols 
(Oxford University Press, 1998-1999); A Calder, Revolutionary Empire: The 
Rise of the English-Speaking Empires from the Fifteenth Century to the 1780s 
(rev’d ed, Pimlico, 1998); JH Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and 
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 Transformation of settler colonies into settler states therefore did 
not mean decolonization for Indigenous peoples. They continued to be 
subjected to the domination of the Europeans who had come to their 
territories.2 Politically, the settlers claimed sovereignty, externally against 
other nation-states and internally over the territory and people of the settler 
state. They exercised this sovereignty – and continue to do so today – 
through government institutions that were modeled on, or adapted from, 
the European institutions to which they were accustomed.3 Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand accordingly remained parliamentary 
monarchies, whereas the United States, in keeping with its rejection of 
British aristocratic traditions, opted for a republican form of government. 
Given their historical foundations, geographical extent, and regional 
diversity, Canada, Australia and the United States also chose federal 
systems of government, whereby sovereignty is divided internally between 
a central government (that also exercises external sovereignty) and various 
states or provinces. However, only the United States acknowledged the 
internal sovereignty of the Indigenous peoples – the Indian tribes or 
nations – living within its borders.4 Canada, Australia and New Zealand all 
relied on the British constitutional doctrines of unity of the Crown and 
parliamentary sovereignty to deny official acknowledgment of even the 
internal sovereignty of their Indigenous peoples. Only recently have 
cracks begun to appear in this colonial edifice, as Indigenous peoples in 
Canada in particular have asserted their inherent right of self-government 
                                                                                                                         
Spain in America 1492-1830 (Yale University Press, 2006). On the 
independence of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, see KC Wheare, The 
Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 
1947). 
2  See chapters by Jennifer Clarke, Jacinta Ruru and Mark Walters. 
3  However, the drafters of the American Constitution were also influenced by 
Indigenous forms of government, particularly that of the Haudenosaunee 
(Iroquois Confederacy): see DA Grinde Jr, The Iroquois and the Founding of the 
American Nation (Indian Historian Press, 1977); BE Johansen, Forgotten 
Founders: Benjamin Franklin, the Iroquois and the Rationale for the American 
Revolution (Gambit, 1982); DA Grinde Jr and BE Johansen, Exemplar of 
Liberty: Native America and the Evolution of Democracy (American Indian 
Studies Center, University of California, 1991).  
4  See Benjamin J Richardson’s chapter on US Indian Law. For judicial 
affirmation, see Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831); Worcester 
v Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet) 515 (1832); US v Lara, 541 US 193 (2004). 




and obtained begrudging, limited acceptance of this right from the 
Canadian state.5 
 European legal systems – including the law of nations (now 
international law) developed in Europe to regulate relations among nation-
states – distinguish between sovereignty and property rights. Sovereignty 
involves the exercise of governmental authority over a territory by a polity 
that asserts and maintains (in principle, if not always in practice) its 
independence. Externally, sovereignty includes the capacity to enter into 
relations with other polities that exercise sovereignty over other territories. 
Internally, it can be equated with jurisdiction, or the authority to make and 
enforce laws and government policies. Property rights, on the other hand, 
involve rights in relation to things (corporeal and incorporeal), including 
land, that arise under and are regulated by domestic laws that generally 
originate from either practice (customary law) or enactment (positive law). 
This distinction is vitally important in colonial contexts because 
acquisition of sovereignty by a colonizing European power did not 
necessarily entail acquisition of proprietary land rights.6 
When the European colonizers arrived in North America, they 
claimed sovereignty vis-à-vis other European powers. But they also 
entered into treaties with Indigenous nations, some of which 
acknowledged the sovereignty of those nations.7 Other North American 
treaties involved acquisition of property rights in land, and so were 
admissions by the Europeans that the Indigenous peoples had such rights.8 
Similarly in New Zealand, by the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi the British 
Crown acknowledged the pre-existing sovereignty (at least in the Māori 
                                                 
5  See Shin Imai’s chapter, and K McNeil, ‘Judicial Approaches to Self-
Government since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal Coherence’ in H Foster, H 
Raven and J Webber (eds), Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder 
Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (UBC Press, 2007) 129. 
6  See M de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law, trans of 
1758 edn by CG Fenwick (Carnegie Institution, 1916) bk I, c 18, ss 204-5; K 
Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (Stevens and Sons, 1966) 99, 
625-36. 
7  Eg the Two-Row-Wampum Treaty with the Haudenosaunee: see M Mitchell, 
‘An Unbroken Assertion of Sovereignty’ in B Richardson (ed), Drumbeat: 
Anger and Renewal in Indian Country (Summerhill Press, 1989) 107, 109-11. 
See also RA Williams Jr, Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty 
Visions of Law and Peace, 1600-1800 (Oxford University Press, 1997). 
8  See Mark Walters’ chapter. 
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version of the Treaty) and land rights of the Māori.9 Nonetheless, the 
British Crown claimed that its own acquisition of sovereignty over a 
territory included underlying title to all the land, and courts have 
consistently upheld this claim.10 The same rule has been applied in 
Australia, where no treaties have been acknowledged and there was no 
judicial recognition of Indigenous land rights (apart from statute) until 
1992.11 
This chapter focuses on the common law land rights of the 
Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. These former settler colonies share a common British heritage, 
and all have legal systems that are based on English law. Despite these 
commonalities, the law in relation to Indigenous land rights has developed 
in distinctive ways in each of these jurisdictions. The connection between 
land rights and Indigenous sovereignty has also been dealt with 
differently. As already mentioned, American law recognized early on that 
land rights and internal sovereignty are both aspects of Indigenous 
territorial rights, while the other three jurisdictions have been reluctant to 
acknowledge this connection. 
The discussion is structured thematically rather than 
geographically. Topics covered are the sources, content and proof of 
Indigenous land rights, and the ways in which they can be extinguished 
and infringed. The focus is on judicial treatment of these matters, rather 
than on legislation and negotiated agreements.12 Comparisons of the law in 
                                                 
9  See Jacinta Ruru’s chapter, and C Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi (Allen and 
Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, 1987); P McHugh, The Māori Magna Carta: New 
Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, 1991); M 
Belgrave, M Kawharu and D Williams (eds), Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives 
on the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
10  See St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen (1888) 14 App 
Cas 46 (PC); Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010; Te Runanga 
o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 20, 23-24 (CA); 
Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA). 
11  By Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 (HC Aust). For evidence of 
an unacknowledged treaty in Tasmania, see H Reynolds, Fate of a Free People: 
A Radical Re-Examination of the Tasmanian Wars (Penguin Books, 1995). On 
statutory land rights, which will not be dealt with here, see Jennifer Clarke’s 
chapter. 
12  For statutory and agreement-based rights, see chapters by Jennifer Clarke, Shin 
Imai, Benjamin J Richardson and Jacinta Ruru.  Resolution of land claims is 
dealt with in Michael Coyle’s chapter. 




the four jurisdictions under consideration are undertaken in relation to 
each of the topics covered. While this comparative analysis is meant to be 
critical, it nonetheless examines these matters from the perspective of the 
dominant legal system in each jurisdiction, which is based on English 
common law. I realize that this involves making a choice of law. This is 
not intended to reflect negatively on the relevance or validity of 
Indigenous legal systems.13 Instead, it is an acknowledgement of the 
limitations of my own knowledge and expertise as a non-Indigenous 
academic, and of the fact that, with the exception of tribal and peacemaker 
courts in the United States, the law of Indigenous rights has been 
formulated and applied primarily by common law courts. 
 
 
II.  SOURCES OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS 
 
While the existence of Indigenous land rights has long been acknowledged 
by governments and courts in the United States, Canada and New Zealand, 
and more recently in Australia, the sources of these rights have not always 
been clear. One possibility is that these rights arise from the Indigenous 
legal systems that were in place when the European colonizers arrived. 
According to established principles of British colonial and international 
law, when the Crown acquired sovereignty over a territory the land rights 
of the local peoples under their own systems of law continued, and became 
enforceable in common law courts, through what is known as the doctrine 
of continuity.14 A second possibility is that the common law itself 
acknowledged that use and occupation of land by Indigenous peoples at 
the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty gave rise to real property 
                                                 
13  See chapters by John Borrows and Christine Zuni Cruz, and Borrows’ book, 
Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (University of Toronto 
Press, 2002). 
14  See M Walters, ‘The “Golden Thread” of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at 
Common Law and under the Constitution Act, 1982’ (1999) 44 McGill Law 
Journal 711; RL Barsh, ‘Indigenous Rights and the Lex Loci in British Imperial 
Law’ in K Wilkins (ed), Advancing Aboriginal Claims: 
Visions/Strategies/Directions (Purich Publishing, 2004) 91; Vattel, above n 6, bk 
III, c 13, ss 200-1; PD O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal and 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1967) vol I, 237-50. 
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rights.15 This alternative should be available to any Indigenous occupants, 
whether or not they had land rights under their own pre-existing systems 
of law.16 Thirdly, Indigenous land rights may have been based on the law 
of nations, as applied by domestic courts. A fourth possibility is that 
Indigenous land rights arose after Crown acquisition of sovereignty, 
through a positive act of creation by the Crown or a legislative body.17 
 In North America, the British Crown purchased Indigenous lands 
by treaty, a practice that was formalized by the Royal Proclamation of 
1763.18 In its decision in St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v 
The Queen19 in 1888, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
suggested that the Royal Proclamation was the source of Indigenous land 
rights in British North America, but in 1973 the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia20 decided that this was 
not the sole source. Justice Judson put it this way: 
 
Although I think that it is clear that Indian title in British 
Columbia cannot owe its origin to the Proclamation of 
1763, the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians 
were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as 
their forefathers had done for centuries. This is what Indian 
title means….21 
 
While this passage indicated that occupation of land can be a source of 
Indigenous land rights, the words ‘organized in societies’ implied a further 
requirement.22 
The notion that any people could exist without being socially 
organized attracted considerable criticism,23 and was notably absent from 
                                                 
15  See K McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Clarendon Press, 1989) esp 196-
221. 
16  Ibid, 193-96. 
17  A fifth potential source not discussed here is natural law or fundamental 
principles of justice: see B Slattery, ‘Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial 
Claims’ (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 681.  
18  See Mark Walters’ chapter. 
19  Above n 10. 
20  [1973] SCR 313. 
21  Ibid, 328. 
22  See Baker Lake v Minister of Indian Affairs [1980] 1 FC 518 (FCTD), 557. 
23  Eg see C Bell and M Asch, ‘Challenging Assumptions: The Impact of Precedent 
in Aboriginal Rights Litigation’ in M Asch (ed), Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in 




the Supreme Court’s subsequent reassessment of Aboriginal title in 
Delgamuukw v British Columbia.24 Chief Justice Lamer stated: 
 
It had originally been thought that the source of aboriginal 
title in Canada was the Royal Proclamation, 1763: see St. 
Catherine's Milling. However, it is now clear that although 
aboriginal title was recognized by the Proclamation, it 
arises from the prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal 
peoples.25 
 
He went on to explain that there are two ways in which prior occupation is 
relevant. First, in the common law physical occupation is proof of 
possession, which in turn grounds title. He thus accepted the second 
potential source we identified earlier.26 But he also suggested another 
‘source for aboriginal title – the relationship between common law and 
pre-existing systems of aboriginal law’.27 However, he does not seem to 
have meant by this that Aboriginal title is derived from Aboriginal law and 
the application of the doctrine of continuity. Instead, when elaborating on 
proof of Aboriginal title, he clarified that both physical occupation and 
Aboriginal law can be relied upon to establish the exclusive occupation at 
the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty that is necessary to prove title. 
Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, he regarded Aboriginal title 
as a generic right that does not vary from one Aboriginal group to another, 
as it would if it were based on the continuation of rights under vastly 
different systems of Aboriginal law.28 However, it is nonetheless 
conceivable that the Chief Justice meant to leave the door open for 
Indigenous peoples to claim title on the basis of their own laws, as an 
alternative to occupation-based title. 
                                                                                                                         
Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference (UBC Press, 
1997) 38. 
24  Above n 10. 
25  Ibid, para 114. 
26  In R v Marshall; R v Bernard [2005] 2 SCR 220, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that occupation of land at the time of Crown sovereignty is the source of 
Aboriginal title. See also Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia [2008] 1 CNLR 
112 (BCSC). 
27  Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 114. 
28  See B Slattery, ‘A Taxonomy of Aboriginal Rights’ in Foster, Raven and 
Webber, above n 5, 111. 
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 The Canadian Supreme Court has distinguished Aboriginal title 
from more limited Aboriginal rights to harvest resources – such as fish, 
game and timber for domestic use – from specific lands.29 These rights 
stem, not from exclusive occupation of land, but from practices, customs 
and traditions in relation to harvesting that were integral to distinctive 
Aboriginal cultures at the time of contact with Europeans30 (or, for the 
Métis, effective European control31). In this context, customs can include 
Aboriginal law,32 but the Supreme Court has not applied the doctrine of 
continuity as such in identifying and enforcing these land rights.33 
 Turning to the United States, the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
existence of Aboriginal or Indian title early in the 19th century.34 In the 
famous case of Johnson v M’Intosh,35 Chief Justice Marshall regarded 
occupation as the basis for this title, but not in the way the Canadian 
Supreme Court did later in Delgamuukw. Instead of applying the common 
law property rule that physical occupation of land is proof of possession 
and title, Marshall CJ relied on his understanding of the doctrine of 
discovery in the law of nations.36 He explained that, on discovering North 
                                                 
29  Eg see R v Adams [1996] 3 SCR 101; R v Côté [1996] 3 SCR 139; R v Sappier; 
R v Gray [2006] 2 SCR 686. 
30  R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507. For critical commentary, see J Borrows, 
‘Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster’ (1997) 22 
American Indian Law Review 37; RL Barsh and JY Henderson, ‘The Supreme 
Court's Van der Peet Trilogy: Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand’ (1997) 42 
McGill Law Journal 993; CC Cheng, ‘Touring the Museum: A Comment on R. v 
Van der Peet’ (1997) 55 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 419. 
31  R v Powley [2003] 2 SCR 207. The Métis, who originated as a distinct people 
from intermarriage between Aboriginal women and European fur-traders, are 
one of the three Aboriginal peoples (Indians and Inuit are the others) whose 
Aboriginal rights were recognized and affirmed by s 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. See PLAH 
Chartrand (ed), Who Are Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples? Recognition, Definition, 
and Jurisdiction (Purich Publishing, 2002). 
32  See Sappier and Gray, above n 29, para 45. 
33  For critical analysis, see K McNeil and D Yarrow, ‘Has Constitutional 
Recognition of Aboriginal Rights Adversely Affected Their Definition?’ (2007) 
37 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 177, esp 204-11. 
34  See Fletcher v Peck, 10 US (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), 142-43. 
35  21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (1823). For detailed background and analysis, see LG 
Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed 
Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
36  See RJ Miller, Native America, Discovered and Conquered: Thomas Jefferson, 
Lewis and Clark, and Manifest Destiny (Praeger Publishers, 2006). 




America, the major European states all wanted to acquire as much of it as 
they could, but, to reduce conflicts among themselves, they all agreed ‘that 
discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose 
authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title 
might be consummated by possession’.37 As a result, the pre-existing 
sovereignty and land rights of the Indian nations were reduced: 
 
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, 
with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, 
and to use it according to their own discretion; but their 
rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, 
were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of 
the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was 
denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery 
gave exclusive title to those who made it.38 
 
Indian title thus became a right of occupancy through application of what 
Marshall CJ considered to be an international principle, which he applied 
domestically. Indian law was not the source of this title, though in his view 
this law continued to apply internally within the Indian territories.39 
 Marshall CJ’s reliance on the law of nations rather than on the 
common law of property or Indigenous law reveals a fundamental 
difference between the United States and Canada. In American law, Indian 
title is not just a proprietary right to land. It really amounts to title to 
territory, which includes governmental authority as well as land rights. So 
the Indian nations have retained residual sovereignty over their territories 
                                                 
37  Johnson, above n 35, 573. Marshall CJ undoubtedly got this wrong, as there was 
no agreement among European nations during the colonial period on the 
requirements for obtaining territorial sovereignty in the Americas: see MF 
Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in 
International Law (Longmans, Green and Co, 1926); J Goebel Jr, The Struggle 
for the Falkland Islands: A Study in Legal and Diplomatic History (1927, 
reissued Kennikat Press, 1971), 47-119; P Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in 
European Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (Cambridge University Press, 
1995); B Slattery, ‘Paper Empires: The Legal Dimensions of French and English 
Ventures in North America’ in J McLaren, AR Buck and NE Wright (eds), 
Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (UBC Press, 
2005) 50. 
38  Johnson, above n 35, 574. 
39  Ibid, 593. See also the cases cited in n 4 above. 
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as ‘domestic dependent nations’ within the United States.40 In Canada, 
land rights and self-government have been treated as separate issues by the 
Supreme Court,41 though we shall see later that Aboriginal title does have 
jurisdictional dimensions that have been acknowledged by the British 
Columbia Supreme Court.42 
 In Australia and New Zealand, Indigenous law has played a more 
prominent role as a source of Aboriginal title to land. Prior to the High 
Court’s decision in Mabo v Queensland [No 2],43 the sole judicially-
acknowledged source of Indigenous land rights in Australia was 
legislation, enacted in the Northern Territory and most states to address 
the denial of land rights in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty.44 In Mabo, the Court 
reassessed this matter, and concluded that the Indigenous peoples of 
Australia did indeed have native title (the Australian term for Indigenous 
land rights) to lands they occupied under their traditional laws and 
customs at the time the British Crown acquired sovereignty. Applying this 
conclusion to the Miriam People of the Murray Islands in the Torres Strait, 
the Court declared that they ‘are entitled as against the whole world to 
possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the Murray 
Islands’.45 
 Although there was no evidence of the communal title that the 
Court apparently declared the Miriam People to have,46 in his judgment 
                                                 
40  Cherokee Nation, above n 4, 17. See also Worcester, above n 4. 
41  See Delgamuukw, above n 10; R v Pamajewon [1996] 2 SCR 821. Compare 
Mitchell v MNR [2001] 1 SCR 911, per Binnie J, and discussion in McNeil, 
above n 5, 143-52. For critical analysis, see K McNeil, ‘Aboriginal Rights in 
Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty’ (1998) 5 Tulsa Journal 
of Comparative and International Law 253, reprinted in K McNeil, Emerging 
Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Native Law 
Centre of Canada, 2001) 58. 
42  In Campbell v British Columbia [2000] 4 CNLR 1. 
43  Above n 11. For background and analysis, see PH Russell, Recognizing 
Aboriginal Title: The Mabo Case and Indigenous Resistance to English-Settler 
Colonialism (University of Toronto Press, 2005). 
44  (1971) 17 FLR 141 (NTSC). See McNeil, above n 15, 290-97; H McRae et al 
(eds), Indigenous Legal Issues: Commentary and Materials (3rd ed, Lawbook 
Co, 2003) 184-86, 204-30. 
45  Mabo, above n 11, Order of the Court, 217. 
46  Moynihan J, the judge who made the factual findings, had ‘found that there was 
apparently no concept of public or general community ownership among the 
people of Murray Island, all the land on Murray Island being regarded as 
belonging to individuals or groups’: ibid, 22. 




Justice Brennan included the following general statement about the source 
of native title that has become entrenched in Australian law: 
 
Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the 
traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional 
customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a 
territory.47 
 
Despite the evident contradiction between this statement and the absence 
of traditional laws and customs supporting the communal title declared by 
the Court,48 the Australian Parliament adopted Brennan J’s statement in 
the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth),49 which was enacted to validate pre-
existing, non-Indigenous land rights and provide a mechanism for 
resolution of native title claims. Section 223(1) of that Act provides: 
 
223. (1)  The expression ‘native title’ or ‘native title rights 
and interests’ means the communal, group or individual 
rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait 
Islanders in relation to land or waters, where: 
  
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the 
traditional laws acknowledged, and the 
traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal 
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and 
(b)  the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, 
by those laws and customs, have a connection 
with the land or waters; and 
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the 
common law of Australia. 
 
                                                 
47  Ibid, 58. 
48  See K McNeil, ‘The Relevance of Traditional Laws and Customs to the 
Existence and Content of Native Title at Common Law’ in Emerging Justice?, 
above n 41, 416, 418-22. 
49  Amended by the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) and the Native Title 
Amendment Act 2007 (Cth). For detailed discussion, see McRae, above n 44, 
esp 247-376; RH Bartlett, Native Title in Australia (2nd ed, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2004). 
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In subsequent judgments, the High Court has relied upon this statutory 
definition, and required strict proof of Indigenous laws and customs 
supporting claimed land rights at the time of Crown acquisition of 
sovereignty, as well as proof that these laws and customs have been 
maintained up to the present day.50 
 In New Zealand, Māori land rights were acknowledged by the 
British Crown in the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, the English version of 
which guaranteed to the Māori ‘the full exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other 
properties’.51 Judicial acknowledgement followed soon after, in the 1847 
decision of the NZ Supreme Court in the Queen v Symonds.52 In Nireaha 
Tamaki v Baker,53 the Privy Council approved of the Symonds decision, 
and rejected a contrary opinion expressed by another New Zealand judge 
that ‘there is no customary law of the Maoris of which the Courts of Law 
can take cognizance’.54 On the contrary, the Privy Council said that the 
statutory regime put in place to integrate Māori title into the English 
landholding system ‘plainly assumes the existence of a tenure of land 
under custom and usage’.55 This view that Māori land rights have their 
source in Māori custom and usage (tikanga Māori) has recently been 
affirmed by the NZ Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa.56 
                                                 
50  Eg see Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 128; Commonwealth v Yarmirr 
[2001] 208 CLR 1; Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1; Members of 
the Yorta Yorta Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422. For critical 
analysis, see L Strelein, Compromised Jurisprudence: Native Title Cases Since 
Mabo (Aboriginal Studies Press, 2006); S Dorsett, ‘An Australian Comparison 
on Native Title to the Foreshore and Seabed’ in C Charters and A Erueti (eds), 
Māori Property Rights in the Foreshore and Seabed: The Last Frontier 
(Victoria University Press, 2007) 59; S Young, The Trouble with Tradition: 
Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, 2008). 
51  Art 2. The Treaty is reproduced in the First Schedule to the Treaty of Waitangi 
Act, NZS 1975, No 114. For detailed analysis, see works cited above in n 9. 
52  [1840-1932] NZPCC 387. 
53  [1901] AC 561. 
54  Prendergast CJ in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 
72. 
55  Nireaha Tamaki, above n 53, 577. 
56  Above n 10. See Jacinta Ruru’s chapter. 




 The doctrine of continuity has thus been applied in New Zealand, 
but less rigidly than in Australia.57 Māori land rights are sourced, not just 
in traditional laws and customs, but also in practice and usage, rendering 
bright-line distinctions between law/custom and practice/usage 
unnecessary.58 This approach also avoids the problem that Indigenous 
claimants have faced in Australia of having to prove that they had a 
normative system prior to Crown acquisition of sovereignty that generated 
‘rights’ cognizable to non-Indigenous Australian judges.59 
 
III.  CONTENT OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS 
 
Indigenous land rights are sui generis – they are different from other 
interests in land under the common law. There are also variations in the 
nature of these rights in each of the four jurisdictions under consideration 
here. These variations are largely due to the different sources of these 
rights examined in the previous section. The content of land rights rooted 
in occupation and use is not the same as content stemming from traditional 
laws and customs. The right of occupancy of the Indian nations in the 
United States also has unique features arising from American 
constitutionalism and the US Supreme Court’s application of the doctrine 
of discovery. 
 In Canada, we have seen that the Supreme Court held in 
Delgamuukw that Aboriginal title arises from exclusive occupation of land 
at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty. At common law, exclusive 
occupation usually results in a fee simple estate, which, apart from Crown 
title, is the largest permissible interest in land.60  However, given its 
unique source in occupation pre-dating Crown sovereignty, and other sui 
generis aspects (such as inalienability and communal nature, to be 
discussed below), the Court declined to equate Aboriginal title with a fee 
simple estate.  But despite arguments by counsel for the Crown, the Court 
                                                 
57  See Young, above n 50, esp 167-200. For recent application of this doctrine in 
another common law jurisdiction, see Cal v Attorney General of Belize; Coy v 
Attorney General of Belize, Claim Nos 171 and 172 of 2007, SC of Belize. 
58  See K McNeil, ‘Legal Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Māori Claims to the 
Foreshore and Seabed’ in Charters and Erueti, above n 50, 83, esp 87-89. 
59  See Yorta Yorta, above n 50. For critical analysis, see McNeil, above n 48; 
Young, above n 50. 
60  See McNeil, above n 15, 6-9, 198. 
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also refused to limit Aboriginal title to traditional uses.  Chief Justice 
Lamer stated: 
 
I have arrived at the conclusion that the content of 
aboriginal title can be summarized by two propositions: 
first, that aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive 
use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for 
a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those 
aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are 
integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures; and second, that 
those protected uses must not be irreconcilable with the 
nature of the group's attachment to that land.61 
 
This means that Aboriginal title includes the natural resources on and 
under the land, including standing timber and oil and gas, regardless of 
whether the Aboriginal titleholders used these resources in the past.62  It 
also means that they have the right to prevent third parties from 
trespassing on their land.63 
 Chief Justice Lamer’s second proposition placed an inherent limit 
on the uses Aboriginal titleholders can make of their lands that was 
intended to preserve the land for future generations.  Elaborating, he said 
that ‘lands subject to aboriginal title cannot be put to such uses as may be 
irreconcilable with the nature of the occupation of that land and the 
relationship that the particular group has had with the land which together 
have given rise to aboriginal title in the first place’.64 As examples of 
situations where this limit might apply, he suggested that Aboriginal 
titleholders might not be able to strip-mine their traditional hunting 
grounds or convert a ceremonial site into a parking lot. 
 Although well-intentioned, the inherent limit the Court placed on 
uses of Aboriginal title land was without precedent, and could seriously 
impede beneficial economic development by Aboriginal communities. It is 
also paternalistic, shifting authority to protect Aboriginal lands from 
                                                 
61  Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 117. 
62  Ibid, para 119-24; Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n 26, para 971-81. 
63  See K McNeil, Defining Aboriginal Title in the 90’s: Has the Supreme Court 
Finally Got It Right? (Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, York University, 
1998) 8-11. 
64  Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 128. 




communities to Canadian judges.65  Given the long history of exploitation 
of Aboriginal lands and removal of natural resources for the benefit of 
colonial interests, one has to wonder who is better placed to ensure the 
protection of these lands for future generations.66 
 In addition to this inherent limit and Aboriginal title’s unique 
source in occupation prior to Crown sovereignty, Chief Justice Lamer 
identified two further sui generis aspects: inalienability and communal 
nature.67 In each of the four jurisdictions under consideration, courts have 
consistently held that Aboriginal title cannot be sold or otherwise 
transferred to anyone other than the Crown, or, in the United States, the 
American government.68  This is a matter of both law and policy.69 
Various reasons have been given for this inalienability, including 
protection of Indigenous peoples from exploitation, incapacity of private 
persons to acquire title other than by government grant, and a need for 
government control of settlement. While each of these explanations has 
some validity, I think a more fundamental reason is that, unlike private 
property interests, Aboriginal title has jurisdictional dimensions that 
cannot be transferred to private persons, and so only another government 
can acquire the title.70 
 In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court took a distinctly propriety 
approach to Aboriginal title, without explicitly considering its 
jurisdictional dimensions. Although the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en 
peoples who brought the action had asked the Court for a declaration of 
their right of self-government as well as of their title, the Court regarded 
self-government as a separate matter, and decided not to deal with it 
directly.71  Significantly, however, in reference to the communal nature of 
Aboriginal title, Chief Justice Lamer observed: 
                                                 
65  For critical discussion, see K McNeil, ‘The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and 
Content of Aboriginal Title’ in Emerging Justice?, above n 41, 102, 116-22. 
66  See Benjamin J Richardson’s Environmental Governance chapter. 
67  See McNeil, above note 15, 221-35; McNeil, above n 65, 122-35. 
68  Eg see Johnson, above n 35; Symonds, above n 52; Mabo, above n 11. 
69  The Royal Proclamation of 1763 prohibited private purchases of Indian lands in 
British North America, and the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi affirmed the Crown’s 
right of pre-emption of Māori lands in New Zealand: see chapters by Mark 
Walters and Jacinta Ruru. 
70  See K McNeil, ‘Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title’ 
(2002) 47 McGill Law Journal 473. 
71  Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 170-71. 
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Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual aboriginal 
persons; it is a collective right to land held by all members 
of an aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to that land 
are also made by that community.72 
 
In addition to attributing legal personality to Aboriginal nations,73 this 
brief passage does contain an indirect acknowledgement of the 
jurisdictional dimensions of Aboriginal title. As recognized by Justice 
Williamson of the BC Supreme Court in Campbell v British Columbia,74 
where title is held communally by an Aboriginal group that has decision-
making authority, there must be a political structure for exercising that 
authority.  In other words, communal title and decision-making authority 
necessitate self-government, at least in relation to Aboriginal title land.75 
 Before discussing the other three jurisdictions, mention needs to be 
made of the content of Aboriginal land rights in Canada apart from title. In 
a number of cases, the Supreme Court has held that Aboriginal peoples 
can have site-specific rights to harvest resources, even though they do not 
have title to the land itself.76  In Sappier and Gray,77 for example, the 
Court held that the Maliseet and Mi’kmaq peoples in New Brunswick have 
an Aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic purposes, such as 
constructing houses and making furniture for themselves. The content of 
these resource-use rights is determined by practices, customs and 
traditions that were integral to the distinctive culture of the people in 
question at the time of contact with Europeans.78 
 Turning to the United States, the Supreme Court’s approach to 
Aboriginal title has never been strictly proprietary. Ever since Johnson v 
M’Intosh79 was decided in 1823, Indian title has been inseparable from 
                                                 
72  Ibid, para 115. 
73  This is an exception to the common law rule that unincorporated collectivities 
are not legal persons and so cannot hold property: see McNeil, above n 65, 122-
25. 
74  Above n 42, para 137-38. 
75  See McNeil, above n 5, 139-43. 
76  See cases cited above in n 29, and K McNeil, ‘Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal 
Rights: What's the Connection?’ (1997) 36 Alberta Law Review 117. 
77  Above n 29. 
78  See Van der Peet, above n 30, and the articles cited in that note. 
79  Above n 35. 




Indian sovereignty.  In the two Cherokee Nation cases in the early 1830s,80 
Chief Justice Marshall affirmed that, after European colonization and 
subsequent incorporation of their territories into the United States, the 
Indian nations retained not only their lands, but also their internal 
sovereignty. Indian title therefore has jurisdictional dimensions that make 
it more akin to title to territory than to title to land: Indian nations exercise 
jurisdiction over their tribal lands in the same way other sovereigns 
exercise jurisdiction over lands within their territories.81 It follows that 
Indian nations have a plenary, collective interest in their lands that 
includes all surface and subsurface rights.82 Moreover, in exercising their 
sovereignty they can make laws providing for the creation of individual 
and other property rights within their territories, but the restriction on 
alienation mentioned above prevents them from selling their lands so that 
they would be removed from their territory and hence their jurisdiction, 
unless the purchaser is the United States.83 Furthermore, unlike Aboriginal 
title in Canada, Indian title is not subject to an inherent limit restricting the 
uses Indian nations can make of their lands. 
 The US Supreme Court’s jurisdictional approach to Indian land 
rights has had a down-side for the Indian nations. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v 
                                                 
80  Cherokee Nation and Worcester, above n 4. See J Norgren, The Cherokee 
Cases: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1996). 
81  See V Deloria Jr and CM Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of 
American Indian Sovereignty (Pantheon Books, 1984); DE Wilkins and KT 
Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law 
(University of Oklahoma Press, 2001); C Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise 
of Modern Indian Nations (WW Norton, 2005); NB Duthu, American Indians 
and the Law (Viking Penguin, 2008). 
82  See US v Shoshone Tribe, 304 US 111, 115-18 (1938); US v Klamath and 
Moadoc Tribes, 304 US 119, 122-23 (1938); Otoe and Missouria Tribe v US, 
131 F Supp 265, 290-91 (1955), cert denied 350 US 848 (1955); US v Northern 
Paiute Nation, 393 F 2d 786, 796 (1968); US ex rel Chunie v Ringrose, 788 F 2d 
638, 642 (1986). 
83  However, from 1887 to 1934, the General Allotment Act, 24 US Stat 388, 
allowed for creation and sale of individual allotments and distribution of 
‘surplus’ Indian land to homesteaders: see DS Otis, The Dawes Act and the 
Allotment of Indian Land, edited by FP Prucha (University of Oklahoma Press, 
1973); FP Prucha, American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and 
the Indian, 1865-1900 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1976) 227-64; CF 
Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern 
Constitutional Democracy (Yale University Press, 1987) 8-9, 19-20; and 
Benjamin J Richardson’s chapter on US Indian Law. 
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United States,84 the Court held that Indian title that has not been 
legislatively or executively recognized by the United States is not a 
property right compensable under the Fifth Amendment to the American 
Constitution.85 Instead, it is a mere ‘right of occupancy [that] may be 
terminated and such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign itself [the 
United States] without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate 
the Indians’.86 Although this decision has been justifiably criticized,87 the 
jurisdictional dimensions of Indian title and the political nature of the 
relationship between the Indian nations and the United States may help to 
explain it.88 Justice Reed, in his majority judgment, remarked that the Tee-
Hit-Ton claim ‘was more a claim of sovereignty than of ownership’.89 As 
discussed in the introduction to this chapter, sovereignty is distinct from 
property, and numerous decisions of the Supreme Court have held that 
Indian sovereignty is subject to the plenary power of Congress.90 
Nonetheless, it is more in keeping with the territorial nature of Indian 
rights, and with earlier American case law, to regard these rights as both 
jurisdictional and proprietary.91 
                                                 
84  348 US 272 (1955). 
85  1 US Stat 21. The Fifth Amendment provides, among other things, that private 
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 
86  Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, above n 84, 279. 
87  Eg see JY Henderson, ‘Unraveling the Riddle of Indian Title’ (1977) 5 
American Indian Law Review 75; NJ Newton, ‘At the Whim of the Sovereign: 
Aboriginal Title Reconsidered’ (1980) 31 Hastings Law Journal 1215; SJ 
Bloxham, ‘Aboriginal Title, Alaskan Native Property Rights, and the Case of the 
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians’ (1980) 8 American Indian Law Review 299. 
88  See McNeil, above n 15, 259-67. For a political analysis of the decision, see K 
McNeil, ‘How the New Deal Became a Raw Deal for Native Americans: The 
Tee-Hit-Ton Alaska Decision and the Denial of Fifth Amendment Protection to 
Indian Land Title’, paper delivered at the Western History Association’s 40th 
Annual Conference, San Antonio, Texas, October 11-14, 2000 (on file with 
author). 
89  Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, above n 84, 287. 
90  Eg see Lone Wolf v Hitchcock, 187 US 553 (1903); US v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 
323 (1978); Cotton Petroleum Corporation v New Mexico, 490 US 163, 192 
(1989); South Dakota v Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 US 329, 343 (1998). For 
critical commentary, see V Deloria Jr, Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An 
Indian Declaration of Independence (University of Texas Press, 1985) 141-60; 
Wilkins and Lomawaima, above n 81, 98-116. See also the concurring judgment 
of Thomas J in Lara, above n 4, questioning the plenary power doctrine. 
91  See text accompanying n 35-40 above. 




 In Australia, reliance on traditional laws and customs and the 
doctrine of continuity has had a very negative impact on Indigenous land 
rights.92 Contrary to the all-encompassing native title of the Miriam People 
declared by the High Court in Mabo, in subsequent cases Indigenous 
claimants have had to prove rights in relation to land by reference to 
specific laws and customs at the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty. 
The content of their rights is therefore defined by their laws and customs.93  
So even if they were in exclusive occupation of land at that time, they 
would not, for example, have any rights to minerals if they did not have 
laws and customs in relation to those resources.94 
 Post-Mabo, the High Court has thus taken a particularized 
approach to native title, treating it as a divisible bundle of rights, each 
arising from specific laws or customs. As a result, a right to take estuarine 
crocodiles is as much a native title right as a right to exclusive 
possession.95 So Australian law contains no equivalent to the fundamental 
Canadian distinction between Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal land 
rights. Moreover, the High Court has adamantly refused to envisage 
continuation of rights other than in relation to land. The doctrine of 
continuity has therefore been applied selectively, eliminating the 
possibility of an Indigenous right of self-government.96 On the positive 
side, this means that native title rights and interests can co-exist with non-
exclusive third party interests, such as some pastoral leaseholds, though in 
the event of conflict the third party interests generally prevail.97 
 While the doctrine of continuity has also been applied in New 
Zealand, it has not had the negative impact seen in Australia. This is 
mainly because Māori land rights are based on tikanga Māori, 
encompassing both custom and usage.98 Rights that were not otherwise 
                                                 
92  For detailed discussion, see McNeil, above n 48; Strelein, above n 50; Young, 
above n 50. 
93  See esp Ward and Yorta Yorta, above n 50. 
94  Ward, above n 50, esp para 382. 
95  Yanner v Eaton (1999) 166 ALR 258 (HC Aust). 
96  See Walker v New South Wales (1994) 182 CLR 45; Coe v Commonwealth 
(1993), 68 ALJR 110; Thorpe v Commonwealth [No 3] (1997) 71 ALJR 767; 
Yorta Yorta, above n 50. 
97  See Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 141 ALR 129 (HC Aust); K McNeil, ‘Co-
Existence of Indigenous Rights and Other Interests in Land in Australia and 
Canada’ [1997] 3 Canadian Native Law Reporter 1. Compare Anderson v 
Wilson (2002) 213 CLR 401 (HC Aust). 
98  See text accompanying n 57-58 above. 
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extinguished have mostly been converted into common law interests by 
the Native Land Court (now the Māori Land Court).99 But as recently 
affirmed by the NZ Court of Appeal, Māori land rights based on tikanga 
Māori can still exist, usually as exclusive interests equivalent to fee simple 
estates, or, less commonly, as more limited interests.100 Although the 
matter has not yet been conclusively decided, it appears that exclusive 
Māori interests include rights to standing timber and mineral resources, a 
conclusion that follows from their equivalence to fee simple.101 
 
 
IV. PROOF OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS 
 
When Indigenous peoples seek judicial acknowledgment of their land 
rights in the courts of the nation-states that have asserted sovereignty over 
them, they have the onus of proving their rights in accordance with tests 
and standards that are usually set by the judiciary.102 These tests and 
standards vary from one jurisdiction to another, depending on the source 
of the title and other factors, but the burden of proof is always onerous. 
The difficulties Indigenous claimants face are compounded by the fact that 
their traditions were generally oral, and courts tend to place greater weight 
on written documents in determining historical issues arising beyond the 
limits of living memory. 
 The Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged these difficulties, 
and has sought to alleviate them to some extent by directing trial judges to 
admit oral histories as evidence and to accord them appropriate weight.  In 
Delgamuukw, for example, the Court overturned the trial judge’s decision 
and ordered a  new trial, in part because he had not given sufficient 
credence or weight to the oral histories of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en 
                                                 
99 See DV Williams, ‘Te Kooti Tango Whenua’: The Native Land Court 1864-
1909 (Huia Publishers, 1999), and Jacinta Ruru’s chapter. 
100  See Ngati Apa, above n 10, esp per Elias CJ, para 46; Young, above n 50, 167-
200. 
101  See New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 142 (CA); 
Tainui Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 513 (CA), per 
Cooke P, 527-30; and discussion in Young, above n 50, 180-82. 
102  For critical analysis in the Canadian context, see K McNeil, ‘The Onus of Proof 
of Aboriginal Title’ (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 775, reprinted in 
Emerging Justice?, above n 41, 136. 




claimants. After acknowledging that the hearsay rule, for example, could 
act as a barrier to the use of oral histories in court, Chief Justice Lamer 
stated that ‘the laws of evidence must be adapted in order that this type of 
evidence can be accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the 
types of historical evidence that courts are familiar with, which largely 
consists of historical documents’.103 Nonetheless, judges still retain 
considerable discretion regarding the weight to be given to any evidence, 
including oral histories.104 Moreover, in Australia there appears to be an 
on-going tendency to give more weight to the written evidence of settlers 
than to the oral histories of Indigenous peoples.105 
 What Indigenous peoples actually have to prove to establish their 
land rights depends largely on the source of these rights.  In Canada, 
where Aboriginal title is based on occupation, Aboriginal peoples have to 
prove that they were in exclusive occupation of the claimed land at the 
time of British assertion of sovereignty.106 As discussed earlier, the 
requisite occupation can be established by proof of physical presence and 
use of the land, and by evidence of Aboriginal law. In Delgamuukw, Chief 
Justice Lamer explained: 
... the source of aboriginal title appears to be grounded both 
in the common law and in the aboriginal perspective on 
land; the latter includes, but is not limited to, their systems 
                                                 
103  Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 87. See also Van der Peet, above n 30, para 68; 
Mitchell, above n 41, para 27-39; Benoit v Canada [2003] 3 CNLR 20 (FCA), 
leave to appeal refused, SCC, 29 April 2004. For discussion, see J Borrows, 
‘Listening for a Change: The Courts and Oral Traditions’ (2001) 39 Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 1. 
104   Mitchell, above n 41, para 36. 
105  Eg see Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] 
FCA 1606, aff’d [2001] 110 FCR 244, (2002) 214 CLR 422. Compare De Rose 
v South Australia [No 1] [2002] FCA 1342, rev’d on other grounds (2003) 133 
FCR 325 (Full FC), and Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402, where 
oral histories figured more prominently. In the United States, the Indian Claims 
Commission, though given a broad mandate that included authority to hear and 
determine ‘claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not 
recognized by any existing rule of law or equity’ (Indian Claims Commission 
Act of 1946, 60 Stat 1049, s 2: see Michael Coyle’s chapter), generally regarded 
oral histories as too vague and self-serving to be relied upon: eg see Pueblo of 
Taos v US, 15 ICC 688, 694-95 (1965).  For commentary, see G Stohr, ‘The 
Repercussions of Orality in Federal Indian Law’ (1999) 31 Arizona State Law 
Journal 679. 
106  Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 144. 
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of law. It follows that both should be taken into account in 
establishing the proof of occupancy. 107 
 
Regarding physical occupation, Lamer CJ said it ‘may be established in a 
variety of ways, ranging from the construction of dwellings through 
cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular use of definite tracts of land 
for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources’.108 Factors to 
consider in deciding whether the occupation was sufficient to establish 
title include ‘the group's size, manner of life, material resources, and 
technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed’.109 
 Somewhat surprisingly, when the Supreme Court next considered 
proof of Aboriginal title in R v Marshall; R v Bernard,110 Chief Justice 
McLachlin emphasized the importance of physical occupation, and 
virtually ignored the evidentiary role of Aboriginal law. She also seems to 
have raised the threshold for establishing occupation by deciding that 
proof of occupation of specific sites rather than of a broader territory is 
required.111 She suggested as well that nomadic peoples may not have 
been in sufficient occupation of at least some of their territories to have 
title. In contrast, Justice LeBel (Fish J concurring), in a separate judgment 
concurring in result, thought the Chief Justice’s physical occupation 
approach was ‘too narrowly focused on common law concepts relating to 
property interests’, and might preclude establishment of Aboriginal title by 
nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples.112 Moreover, in his trial decision in the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation case in 2007, Justice Vickers of the BC Supreme Court 
found that Marshall and Bernard differed from the claim before him 
because in that case ‘the persons accused both attempted to prove 
Aboriginal title at specific sites’ to defend themselves against charges of 
violations of provincial forestry legislation,113 whereas in the Tsilhqot’in 
                                                 
107  Ibid, para 147. 
108  Ibid, para 149. 
109  Ibid, quoting B Slattery, ‘Understanding Aboriginal Rights’ (1987) 66 Canadian 
Bar Review 727, 758. 
110  Above n 26. For critical commentary, see K McNeil, ‘Aboriginal Title and the 
Supreme Court: What’s Happening?’ (2006) 69 Saskatchewan Law Review 281. 
111  Compare the more territorial approach taken by Cromwell JA of the NSCA and 
Daigle JA of the NBCA: R v Marshall (2003) 218 NSR (2d) 78, esp para 183; R 
v Bernard (2003) 262 NBR (2d) 1, esp para 85. 
112  Marshall and Bernard, above n 26, para 110, 126. 
113  In Marshall and Bernard, ibid, para 142-43, LeBel J also expressed reservations 
over deciding Aboriginal title in a quasi-criminal prosecution. See S Imai, ‘The 




claim for a declaration of Aboriginal title the evidence ranged ‘over tracts 
of land’.114 
 Marshall and Bernard also addressed the requirement that the 
occupation be exclusive. After noting that factual evidence of acts of 
exclusion might not be available, Chief Justice McLachlin concluded that 
evidence of acts of exclusion is not required to establish 
aboriginal title. All that is required is demonstration of 
effective control of the land by the group, from which a 
reasonable inference can be drawn that it could have 
excluded others had it chosen to do so.115 
 
In connection with exclusivity, in Delgamuukw the Court briefly 
addressed another issue, namely, whether two or more Aboriginal groups 
can have joint title if they occupied land to the exclusion of other 
Aboriginal groups.  Chief Justice Lamer suggested that shared exclusivity 
could result in joint Aboriginal title,116 as recognized by the US Supreme 
Court in United States v Santa Fe Pacific Railroad.117 While this issue has 
not, as far as I know, received further judicial consideration in Canada, 
several American decisions have acknowledged that joint title can exist 
where two or more Indian nations amicably occupied land to the exclusion 
of other Indian nations.118 
As discussed earlier, Canadian law distinguishes between 
Aboriginal title and other land rights, which generally involve rights to 
harvest particular resources from specific lands. Proof of the latter 
involves meeting the test created by the Supreme Court in the Van der 
                                                                                                                         
Adjudication of Historical Evidence: A Comment and an Elaboration on a 
Proposal by Justice LeBel’ (2006) 55 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 
146. 
114  Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n 26, para 582. 
115  Marshall and Bernard, above n 26, para 65. 
116  Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 158. 
117  314 US 339 (1941). 
118  See Iowa Tribe of the Iowa Reservation v US, 195 Ct Cl 365, 394-96 (1971); 
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v US, 490 F 2d 935, 944 (1974, Ct 
Cl); US v Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F 2d 1383, 1394-95 (1975, Ct Cl); 
Strong v US, 518 F 2d 556, 561-62 (1975, Ct Cl), cert denied 423 US 1015 
(1975); Uintah Ute Indians v US, 28 Fed Cl 768, 785, 787 n 21 (1993).  For 
discussion, see MJ Kaplan, ‘Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to 
Indian Lands’ (1979, updated 2003) LEXSEE 41 ALR Fed 425, heading 3b, 
‘“Exclusive” use or occupancy; joint aboriginal title’. 
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Peet decision: Aboriginal claimants must show that the activity they claim 
a right over was ‘an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to 
[their] distinctive culture’ at the time of European contact119 or, for the 
Métis, effective European control.120 Applying this test in 2006 in Sappier 
and Gray, Justice Bastarache said that ‘[f]lexibility is important when 
engaging in the Van der Peet analysis because the object is to provide 
cultural security and continuity for the particular aboriginal society’.121 
Regarding the ‘integral to the distinctive culture’ aspect of the test, he 
clarified: 
 
What is meant by ‘culture’ is really an inquiry into the pre-
contact way of life of a particular aboriginal community, 
including their means of survival, their socialization 
methods, their legal systems, and, potentially, their trading 
habits. The use of the word ‘distinctive’ as a qualifier is 
meant to incorporate an element of aboriginal specificity. 
However, ‘distinctive’ does not mean ‘distinct’, and the 
notion of aboriginality must not be reduced to ‘racialized 
stereotypes of Aboriginal peoples’.122 
 
On the basis of the evidence presented, the Supreme Court accordingly 
held that the Pabineau and Woodstock First Nations of the Mi’kmaq and 
Maliseet peoples have an Aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic 
uses on Crown lands traditionally used by them for that purpose. 
 In the United States, there is no equivalent to the distinction 
between Indian title and other Indian land rights found in Aboriginal rights 
law in Canada.123 The explanation appears to be that American courts have 
defined occupation more broadly, so that virtually any Indian use of lands 
can give rise to Aboriginal or Indian title.124 As early as 1835, Justice 
Baldwin expressed the opinion of the Supreme Court that Indian 
                                                 
119  Van der Peet, above n 30, para 46, 73. 
120  Powley, above n 31. 
121  Sappier and Gray, above n 29, para 33. 
122  Ibid, para 45, quoting J Borrows and LI Rotman, ‘The Sui Generis Nature of 
Aboriginal Rights: Does it Make a Difference?’ (1997) 36 Alberta Law Review 
9, 36. 
123  While Indian resource rights can exist off their lands in the United States, this is 
usually the result of treaties: see Duthu, above n 81, 99-109. 
124  See FS Cohen, ‘Original Indian Title’ (1947) 32 Minnesota Law Review 28. 




occupation ‘was considered with reference to their habits and modes of 
life; their hunting-grounds were as much in their actual possession as the 
cleared fields of the whites, and their rights to its exclusive enjoyment in 
their own way and for their own purposes were as much respected’.125 So 
while Indian title, like Aboriginal title in Canada, is based on exclusive 
occupation, American courts have taken a distinctly territorial approach to 
its geographical extent. In Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, Justice Douglas 
said: 
 
If it were established as a fact that the lands in question 
were, or were included in, the ancestral home of the 
Walapais in the sense that they constituted definable 
territory occupied exclusively by the Walapais (as 
distinguished from lands wandered over by many tribes), 
then the Walapais had ‘Indian title’.126 
 
The same territorial approach has been taken in other American 
cases, including decisions of the Court of Claims on appeals from the 
Indian Claims Commission, which had been established in 1946 to resolve 
outstanding Indian claims against the US government.127 Even tribes 
described as ‘nomadic’ have been held to have Indian title to lands they 
used on a regular basis in accordance were their own ways of life.128 
Moreover, title extends to ‘seasonal or hunting areas over which the 
Indians had control even though those areas were only used 
intermittently’.129 
Another important distinction between Canadian and American 
law in relation to proof is that Indian claimants in the United States do not 
have to prove occupation of land at the time of British, or even American, 
                                                 
125  Mitchel v US, 34 US (9 Pet) 711, 746 (1835). 
126  Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, above n 117, 345. 
127  See I Sutton (ed), Irredeemable America: The Indians’ Estate and Land Claims 
(University of New Mexico Press, 1985), and Michael Coyle’s chapter. 
128  US v Kagama, 118 US 375, 381 (1886); Cramer v US, 261 US 219, 227 (1923); 
Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v US, 324 US 335, 338-40 (1945); 
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v US, 120 F Supp 202, 204 (1954, Ct Cl), aff’d above n 84, 
285-88. 
129  Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon v US, 177 Ct 
Cl 184, 194 (1966). See also Delaware Tribe of Indians v US, 130 Ct Cl 782, 
789 (1955); Spokane Tribe v US, 163 Ct Cl 58, 66 (1963). 
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assertion of sovereignty. Instead, proof of occupation ‘for a long time’ is 
sufficient.130 In Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of 
Oregon v United States, Justice Durfee explained: 
 
The time requirement, as a general rule, cannot be fixed at a 
specific number of years.  It must be long enough to have 
allowed the Indians to transform the area into domestic 
territory [so that the court is not] ‘creating aboriginal title in 
a tribe which itself played the role of conqueror but a few 
years before’.131  
 
This means that Indian nations could acquire title from one another 
(especially if by peaceful transfer) or by occupying vacant lands after 
American assertion of sovereignty,132 and eases the burden of proof by 
shortening the timeframe for establishing the requisite occupation.133 
 Finally, while American courts have held that the occupation 
required for Indian title is a matter of fact,134 what has to be established is 
not so much physical occupation as control of territory. In United States v 
Seminole Indians of Florida, Justice Collins said that 
 
the Government leans far too heavily in the direction of 
equating ‘occupancy’ (or capacity to occupy) with actual 
possession, whereas the key to Indian title lies in evaluating 
the manner of land-use over a period of time. Physical 
                                                 
130  Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v US, 161 Ct Cl 189, 202, 205-7 
(1963), cert denied 375 US 921 (1963); Confederated Tribes of the Warm 
Springs Reservation, above n 129, 194; US v Pueblo of San Ildefonso, above n 
118, 1394; Seneca Nation of Indians v New York, 206 F Supp 2d 448, 503 (2002, 
WDNY). 
131  Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation, above n 129, 194. 
quoting Sac and Fox Tribe, above n 130, 206. 
132  Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, above n 118. 
133  In US v Seminole Indians of Florida, 180 Ct Cl 375 (1967), 58 years was held to 
be a sufficiently long time to acquire title. In Alabama-Coushatta Tribe v US, 28 
Fed Cl 95 (1993), 30 years sufficed. 
134  See Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, above n 117, 345, quoted in text accompanying n 
126 above; Pueblo of San Ildefonso, above n 118, 1394; Six Nations v US, 173 
Ct Cl 899 at 910 (1965). 




control or dominion over the land is the dispositive 
criterion.135 
 
  Proof of native title in Australia is another matter entirely. What is 
required is not evidence of exclusive occupation or control, but rather of a 
connection to the land through traditional laws and customs.136 This 
requirement originated from Justice Brennan’s judgment in Mabo.137 As 
we have seen, it was given statutory force by incorporation into the 
definition of native title in section 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993,138 
which, as interpreted by the High Court, makes it necessary for claimants 
to prove that they have maintained a connection with the land through 
substantially uninterrupted acknowledgement and observance of their laws 
and customs from the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty to the 
present.139 This requirement make proof of native title especially difficult 
for Indigenous peoples in more populated areas whose connection to the 
land and observance of traditional laws and customs have been severely 
interfered with by settlers. Particularly disturbing is the pronouncement by 
the Full Federal Court in 2008 that the cause of loss of connection and 
observance is irrelevant.140 Apparently, even illegal squatting – a 
historically common way of taking Indigenous land in Australia – could 
have resulted in loss of native title because it would have severed the 
necessary connection with the land. 
 The Australian High Court’s approach to native title claims also 
necessitates proof of specific laws and customs relating to particular uses 
of lands and resources.141 It is not enough for claimants to establish they 
had, and have maintained, a general system of traditional laws and 
                                                 
135  Seminole Indians of Florida, above n 133, 385-86 (emphasis in original). 
136  See Ward, above n 50, esp para 89-93. 
137  Mabo, above n 11, esp 58-60. 
138  See text accompanying n 49-50 above. 
139  Yorta Yorta, above n 50. See also De Rose [No 1], above n 105 (Full FC); De 
Rose v South Australia [No 2] (2005) 145 FCR 290; Northern Territory v 
Alyawarr (2005) 145 FCR 442; Bodney v Bennell [2008] FCAFC 63. 
140  Bodney v Bennell, above n 139, para 96-97, relying on Yorta Yorta, above n 50, 
para 89-90. 
141  See esp Ward, above n 50. For application of the High Court’s approach, see 
Daniel v Western Australia [2003] FCA 666; Sampi v Western Australia [2005] 
FCA 777; Rubibi Community (No 7) v Western Australia [2006] FCA 459; Risk 
v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404, aff’d (2007) 240 ALR 75 (Full FC). 
Compare Neowarra, above n 105. 
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customs in relation to land; instead, they have to prove that their laws and 
customs provide specific ‘rights’ that are recognizable as such by common 
law courts.142 So, unlike in Canada where historical practices alone can 
generate rights, Australian law requires proof that practices were engaged 
in pursuant to traditional laws and customs.143 Moreover, as mentioned 
previously, in Australia proof of exclusive occupation does not necessarily 
result in all-inclusive rights to surface and subsurface resources.144 
 While New Zealand has also based Māori land rights on pre-
existing laws and customs, this has not had the negative consequences that 
reliance on traditional laws and customs has had in Australia. This is 
because Māori land rights are more broadly grounded in tikanga Māori, 
which includes both custom and usage.145 Proof of Māori land rights 
therefore involves proof of custom or usage in relation to the claimed land 
at the time of British assertion of sovereignty in 1840. If the claimant 
group proves exclusive occupation, they have title equivalent to an 
inalienable fee simple estate, whereas proof of customary rights or uses 
not amounting to exclusive occupation could result in more limited 
interests.146 Moreover, unlike in Australia, it does not appear to be 
necessary in New Zealand to prove continuous observance of tikanga 
Māori from the time of British assertion of sovereignty to the present.147 
As in Canada, where title has been established as of that time, apparently it 
is presumed to continue until shown to have been extinguished.148  
                                                 
142  For detailed discussion and criticism, see Young, above n 50. 
143  See Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 (NSWCA); Derschaw v Sutton 
(1996) 90 A Crim R 9 (Full SCWA); Dillon v Davies (1998) 156 ALR 142 (SC 
Tas). For discussion, see McNeil, above n 48, 454-58; Dorsett, above n 50 at 61-
66; Young, above n 50, 338-42; A Erueti, ‘The Recognition of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights to Traditional Lands: The Evaluation of States by International 
Treaty Bodies’ in Charters and Erueti, above n 50, 175, 178-83. 
144  Ward, above n 50, esp para 382. 
145  This is a statutory as well as common law approach: Kauwaeranga Judgment, 
Native Land Court, 1870, reproduced (1984) 14 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 227; Ngati Apa, above n 10. See Jacinta Ruru’s chapter. 
146  See text accompanying n 98-101 above. 
147  See Young, above n 50, 172-75. 
148  See K McNeil, ‘Continuity of Aboriginal Rights’, in Wilkins, above n 14, 127. 
However, the New Zealand Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, s 50(1)(b), created 
a statutory exception: see McNeil, above n 58, 92-93, 103-16; Dorsett, above n 
50, 74-77; Erueti, above n 143, 186-87. 




V. EXTINGUISHMENT AND INFRINGEMENT OF 
INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS 
 
In all four jurisdictions considered in this chapter, Indigenous land rights 
can be voluntarily surrendered by means of a treaty or other agreement. In 
British North America, this was specified in the Royal Proclamation of 
1763, which forbid private acquisition of Indian lands and stipulated that 
they could only be acquired by the Crown or a proprietary government at a 
public assembly of the Indian titleholders gathered for that purpose.149 The 
Proclamation continued the pre-existing Crown practice of purchasing 
Indian lands, resulting in land-surrender treaties in what is now Canada 
from 1763 to the 1920s, when the Canadian government stopped 
negotiating treaties. The process recommenced in the 1970s when, 
following the Supreme Court of Canada’s acknowledgment of the 
existence of Aboriginal title in Calder,150 Canada established the 
comprehensive claims process.151 In the 1990s, a similar process was 
created in British Columbia when the BC Treaty Commission was set up 
to facilitate the negotiation of land claims in that province.152 
 Extinguishment of Aboriginal title by treaty or other agreement is 
controversial. Regarding the Canadian historical treaties, questions remain 
regarding interpretation of the land-surrender provisions, and what the 
Aboriginal parties understood those provisions to mean.153 In the Prairie 
Provinces, for example, it has often been contended that the land was to be 
shared, and that only surface rights to the depth of a plow were being 
                                                 
149  See Mark Walters’ chapter. 
150  Above n 20. 
151  See Michael Coyle’s chapter. 
152  See C McKee, Treaty Talks in British Columbia: Negotiating a Mutually 
Beneficial Future (UBC Press, 1996); A Woolford, Between Justice and 
Certainty: Treaty Making in British Columbia (UBC Press, 2005); T Penikett, 
Reconciliation: First Nations Treaty Making in British Columbia (Douglas and 
McIntyre, 2006). 
153  See Re Paulette (1973) 42 DLR (3d) 8 (NWTSC), rev’d on other grounds (1975) 
63 DLR (3d) 1 (NWTCA), [1977] 2 SCR 628; P Macklem, ‘The Impact of 
Treaty 9 on Natural Resource Development in Northern Ontario’ in Asch, above 
n 23, 97; S Imai, ‘Treaty Lands and Crown Obligations: The “Tracts Taken Up” 
Provision’ (2001) 27 Queen’s Law Journal 1. 
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accorded to the government for the purpose of farming.154 Questions have 
also been raised over whether Aboriginal peoples had the authority under 
their own systems of law to alienate their lands.155 In the modern-day 
treaty process, extinguishment of rights has been vigorously opposed by 
Aboriginal peoples, and compromises have been sought to affirm existing 
rights while meeting government demands for certainty.156 
 In the United States, the federal government continued the British 
policy of acquiring Indian lands by purchase, though often by applying 
coercion, especially during the 19th century removal period when many 
eastern tribes were moved from their homelands to Indian Territory in 
what later became the State of Oklahoma.157 Congress also has the 
authority to extinguish or infringe Indian title unilaterally, without any 
legal obligation to pay compensation unless the United States had 
previously recognized the title by treaty, agreement or unilateral 
government action.158 The states, however, have no such authority, as the 
Commerce Clause in the American Constitution gives Congress exclusive 
jurisdiction over Indian affairs, and the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, 
dating from the 1790s, prohibit state acquisition of Indian lands.159 In the 
                                                 
154  See Treaty 7 Elders et al, The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7 
(McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996) esp 113-23, 144-45; H Cardinal and W 
Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That Our Peoples 
Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized as Nations (University of Calgary Press, 
2000) esp 34-47. 
155  See L Little Bear, ‘Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian “Grundnorm”’ in JR 
Ponting (ed), Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization 
(McClelland and Stewart, 1986) 243, 247; Canada, Report of the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol 2, Restructuring the Relationship 
(Supply and Services Canada, 1996) 459; S Venne, ‘Understanding Treaty 6: An 
Indigenous Perspective’ in Asch, above n 23, 173, esp 192-93. 
156  See Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol 2, above n 155, 
527-57; M Asch and N Zlotkin, ‘Affirming Aboriginal Title: A New Basis for 
Comprehensive Claims Negotiations’ in Asch, above n 23, 208; and works cited 
in n 152 above. 
157  See FP Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years (Harvard 
University Press, 1962); RN Satz, American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era 
(University of Oklahoma Press, 1975); MD Green, The Politics of Indian 
Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crisis (University of Nebraska 
Press, 1982). 
158  Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, above n 84. See also Kaplan, above n 118, heading III, 
‘Extinguishing aboriginal title’. 
159  Originally 1 US Stat 137 (1790). See County of Oneida v Oneida Indian Nation, 
470 US 226 (1985); RN Clinton and MT Hotopp, ‘Judicial Enforcement of the 




past, the United States could also extinguish Indian title by conquest,160 
though more commonly military force was used to compel Indian tribes to 
cede their lands to the government.161 
 In theory, British common law restrictions on the authority of the 
Crown would have prevented the taking of Indigenous lands by conquest 
in Canada, Australia and New Zealand after Crown acquisition of 
sovereignty. In practice, however, legal constraints are not always 
effective: in Australia, Aboriginal peoples were often killed or driven from 
their lands by force, whereas in New Zealand the wars of the 1860s 
resulted in substantial loss of life and land.162 Because Indigenous land 
rights were not acknowledged (apart from statute) in Australia prior to the 
Mabo decision in 1992,163 no recognized land-surrender treaties or 
agreements were entered into there. The Treaty of Waitangi in New 
Zealand confirmed rather than extinguished Māori land rights, though 
large areas of Māori land have been lost through conversion of those rights 
to common law interests and subsequent alienations.164 
In the absence of constitutional protections for Indigenous land 
rights, there are no domestic legal impediments to extinguishment or 
infringement of those rights by legislatures that have constitutional 
authority over them.165 Legislative extinguishment has occurred relatively 
recently in Australia and New Zealand. By the Native Title Act 1993 (as 
amended),166 the Australian Parliament validated some past acts, such as 
                                                                                                                         
Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern 
Land Claims’ (1979) 31 Maine Law Review 17; GC Shattuck, The Oneida Land 
Claims: A Legal History (Syracuse University Press, 1991). 
160  See Johnson, above n 35, 586-92; Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, above n 117, 347. 
161  See generally S Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on 
the Frontier (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). 
162  See H Reynolds, The Other Side of the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the 
European Invasion of Australia (Penguin Books, 1982); D Day, Claiming a 
Continent: A New History of Australia (HarperCollins, 2001) 73-88; J Belich, 
The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict 
(Auckland University Press, 1987); M King, The Pelican History of New 
Zealand (Penguin Books, 2003), 211-24.  
163  Above n 11. 
164  See Orange, above n 9, 80-85; McHugh, above n 9, 333-34. 
165  See K McNeil, ‘Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, 
Legislation and Judicial Discretion’ (2001-2002) 33 Ottawa Law Review 301, 
esp 317-27. 
166  Above n 49. 
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Crown grants of land, so that they extinguished or infringed native title 
rights.167 In 2004, the New Zealand Parliament enacted the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act, extinguishing most Māori rights to coastal lands below the 
high-water mark.168 
It is, however, essential to distinguish between legislative and 
executive authority. In parliamentary systems of government established 
on the British model, the executive branch of government has no authority 
apart from statute to take away or infringe property rights.169 As 
Indigenous land rights in Canada, Australia and New Zealand are 
proprietary, it should be unconstitutional for the executive branch to 
extinguish or infringe them without clear and plain statutory authority. 
While this appears to be the law in Canada and New Zealand,170 in 
Australia the High Court has held that, prior to enactment of the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth),171 native title could be extinguished 
executively by inconsistent Crown grant or Crown appropriation of the 
land for its own use, apparently without clear and plain statutory authority 
to do so.172 Moreover, no compensation needed to be paid for this 
                                                 
167  See McRae, above n 44, 341-45; Bartlett, above n 49, 392-402. However, s 
51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution (s 9 of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act, 63 and 64 Vict, c 12 (UK)), provides that the taking of 
property by Parliament be on ‘just terms’, and so the Native Title Act 1993 
provides for compensation: McRae, 356-57; Bartlett, 402. 
168  See Charters and Erueti, above n 50. 
169  Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1030 (CP); Attorney-General v De Keyser’s 
Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508, 569 (HL); Spooner Oils Ltd v Turner Valley Gas 
Conservation Board [1933] SCR 629. See JW Ely Jr, The Guardian of Every 
Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, 1998) 13-14, 54-55. 
170  Re Canada, see Calder, above n 20, 402 (Hall J, dissenting on the deciding 
issue); Guerin v The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 335, 376; R v Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 
1075, 1099; Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 113, 180; and discussion in McNeil, 
above n 165, 311-16. Re New Zealand, see Nireaha Tamaki, above n 53. 
171  This Act of Parliament provides legislative protection against discriminatory 
actions by the states that would extinguish native title rights: Mabo v 
Queensland [No 1] (1988) 166 CLR 186 (HC Aust). The Native Title Act 1993 
provides further protection because valid Commonwealth legislation prevails, 
due to s 109 of the Australian Constitution, above n 167, over inconsistent state 
legislation: Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 128 ALR 1 (HC Aust). 
See also Ward, above n 50. 
172  Mabo, above n 11; Fejo, above n 50. 




unilateral taking.173 As both the taking and the denial of compensation are 
inconsistent with fundamental common law principles,174 it appears that 
the High Court was driven by political considerations to favour the 
property rights and economic interests of non-Indigenous Australians over 
the pre-existing land rights of the Indigenous peoples.175 
In Canada, Aboriginal land rights have two additional 
constitutional protections that prevent even legislative extinguishment and 
infringement in some instances. First, section 91(24) of the Constitution 
Act, 1867, placed ‘Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians’, within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.176 As a result, the 
Supreme Court has held that the provinces have lacked the constitutional 
authority to extinguish Aboriginal title ever since Confederation in 
1867.177 While this should mean that the provinces also lack the authority 
to infringe Aboriginal title,178 the Supreme Court has suggested otherwise, 
                                                 
173  Mabo, above n 11, 15. The requirement in s 51(xxxi) of the Australian 
Constitution, above n 167, that taking of property be on ‘just terms’, applies 
only to Parliament, not to state legislatures, from the time the Constitution was 
proclaimed as of January 1, 1901. 
174  See K McNeil, ‘Racial Discrimination and Unilateral Extinguishment of Native 
Title’ (1996) 1 Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 1, reprinted in Emerging 
Justice?, above n 41, 357. Extinguishment by grant is also inconsistent with 
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High Court and American Law’ (1997) 2 Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 
365, reprinted in Emerging Justice?, above n 41, 409. Moreover, any 
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ratified by Congress: Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v US, 494 F 
2d 1386, 1394 (1974, Ct Cl), cert denied 419 US 1021 (1974). 
175  See K McNeil, ‘The Vulnerability of Indigenous Land Rights in Australia and 
Canada’ (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 271. 
176  Constitution Act, 1867, 30 and 31 Vict, c 3 (UK). 
177  Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 172-83. Compare Australia, where Parliament 
first received jurisdiction over Indigenous affairs by a 1967 amendment to s 
51(xxvi) of the Constitution, above n 167: see Jennifer Clarke’s chapter. 
Because this jurisdiction is concurrent with state jurisdiction, the states are only 
barred from extinguishing native title to the extent that the extinguishment is 
inconsistent with federal legislation, such as the Native Title Act 1993: see n 
171 above. 
178  See Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n 26, para 1001-49; K McNeil, ‘Aboriginal Title 
and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction’ 
(1998) 61 Saskatchewan Law Review 431, reprinted in Emerging Justice?, 
above n 41, 249; K Wilkins, ‘Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights’ (1999) 22 
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without adequately explaining how provincial legislatures can infringe 
rights that are within the core of the exclusive jurisdiction of 
Parliament.179 More recently, however, the Court has held that treaty 
rights, which are also within the core of Parliament’s exclusive section 
91(24) jurisdiction, are immune from provincial laws that would infringe 
them.180 Logically, Aboriginal title should have the same division-of-
powers protection.181 
The second protection accorded to Aboriginal land rights in 
Canada is found in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which 
recognized and affirmed the ‘existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada’.182 The Supreme Court has held that this 
provision prevents these rights from being unilaterally extinguished, even 
by Parliament.183 So, since 1982, extinguishment can only occur 
(constitutional amendment aside) with the consent of the Aboriginal 
peoples concerned. The Court has nonetheless held that, despite section 
35(1), Aboriginal and treaty rights, including land rights, can still be 
infringed, provided the test for justifiable infringement laid down in 
Sparrow has been met.184 This test requires the government to prove two 
things: first, a valid legislative objective for the infringement that is 
substantial and compelling; and second, that the Crown’s fiduciary 
obligations to the Aboriginal people in question have been respected. 
Depending on the circumstances, the second branch of the test can involve 
asking the following questions: ‘whether there has been as little 
infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result; whether, in a 
situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available; and, whether the 
aboriginal group in question has been consulted with respect to the 
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conservation measures being implemented’.185 Since Sparrow, the 
consultation requirement has become a major factor in determining 
whether an infringement is justifiable. The Supreme Court has decided 
that governments must engage in consultation, and in appropriate 
situations accommodate Aboriginal interests, where Aboriginal rights, 
though not yet established, are asserted and supported by some 
evidence.186 The scope of the consultation depends on the strength of the 
case supporting the rights and the seriousness of the infringement.187 
While government infringement of Aboriginal land rights is still 
possible in Canada, those rights nonetheless have much greater protection 
than Indigenous land rights in the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand. The addition of section 35(1) to the Canadian Constitution in 
1982 took away the parliamentary equivalent of the plenary power that the 
US Congress still has over Indian tribes. Unilateral extinguishment has 
been barred, so that the kind of termination policy pursued by Congress in 
the 1950s cannot occur in Canada.188 Nor can the Canadian Parliament 
enact provisions like those in the Native Title Act 1993 and the Foreshore 
and Seabed Act 2004 that have extinguished some land rights in Australia 
and New Zealand. Even parliamentary infringements of land rights have to 
be justified by a stringent test. The duty to consult and to accommodate 
asserted Aboriginal rights has also become an effective means for forcing 
governments to involve Aboriginal peoples in decision-making, especially 
in regard to resource development on their claimed territories. As 
consultation must take place with Aboriginal representatives who have the 
authority to act on behalf of their peoples, the process of consultation itself 
is an exercise of self-government, and a way for Aboriginal peoples to 
assert and establish government-to-government relationships. 
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This discussion has revealed that, despite their common British heritage 
and legal traditions, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
have developed divergent legal doctrines in relation to Indigenous land 
rights. Differences in the content and requirements for proof of these 
rights stem largely from differences in judicial opinion over their source. 
In the United States and Canada, the courts have ruled that 
occupation is the source of Indigenous title, but the American approach 
has distinctly territorial and jurisdictional dimensions, whereas the 
Canadian approach is more narrowly proprietary. In the United States, 
Indian nations have both residual sovereignty and land rights in the 
territories occupied by them. By contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court has 
determined that Aboriginal title is a property right arising from occupation 
of land that is separate from governance rights. And yet the Court has 
acknowledged that Aboriginal nations have decision-making authority 
over their collectively-held lands, authority one Canadian judge has 
concluded is governmental in nature. 
In Australia and New Zealand, the courts have decided that 
Indigenous land rights stem from the Indigenous legal systems that existed 
prior to British acquisition of sovereignty. Through the doctrine of 
continuity, these rights became enforceable in common law courts. 
Unfortunately, in applying this doctrine the Australian judiciary has 
required strict proof that traditional laws and customs confer specific 
rights, and that knowledge and observance of the laws and customs have 
continued up to the present. These requirements have narrowed the scope 
of claimable rights, and imposed impossible burdens of proof on some 
Indigenous claimants. In New Zealand, application of the doctrine of 
continuity has been less problematic, as land rights stem from tikanga 
Māori, broadly defined as including both custom and usage. Nor is proof 
of continuous observance of tikanga Māori necessary, except where 
required by statute. 
The authority of non-Indigenous governments to extinguish or 
infringe Indigenous land rights is dependent on a nation-state’s 
constitution. In the four jurisdictions examined here, these rights are most 
vulnerable to legislative extinguishment and infringement in New Zealand 
because the unicameral Parliament has sole authority over them. In the 




United States and Canada, exclusive federal jurisdiction over Indigenous 
affairs provides some protection against the states and provinces. In 
Australia, federalism also provides some protection against the states, to 
the extent that the Commonwealth Parliament legislates in favour of 
Indigenous land rights. Only in Canada are land rights generally protected 
against legislation by a specific constitutional provision. Ultimately, 
however, the fate of Indigenous rights depends on the vision of judges, the 
political will of legislators, and a belief within the larger community that 
justice requires that these rights be maintained and respected.  
 
